The US Navy has rightfully been undertaking a considerable review and revaluation of the problems that led to the recent ship collisions between the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain with commercial vessels, resulting in the deaths of 17 sailors. The results so far are rather mixed. A report issued on November 1 on the two collisions, deemed the sailor’s deaths to have been “avoidable” and criticized mistakes made by the ships’ sailors and their commanders prior to the collisions. A US Government Accountability Office report in September highlighted deficiencies in training resulting from lengthy deployments of US ships based in Japan. Some in the the Navy have also pointed out the risks of getting inadequate sleep onboard these ships due to demanding watch schedules.
The reports, by and large, all sounded very familiar and have a tendency to focus on the end results of mistakes and deficiencies rather than their underlying causes. A recent article in Stars and Stripes, however, addresses failure in Navy culture as addressed in a Navy review released recently which spotlights weaknesses contributing to decreased efficiency and safety in the fleet. They also raise the Balisle Report, a scathing 2010 internal Navy report on the surface fleet’s readiness, which urged officials to counter the “underway at all costs” mentality. Continue reading